




A view from NATO:

The BALTAP Area and the Baltics in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions and Reality as well as Final Defence Planning

Conference
Soviet Troops in Estonia: Cold War Tasks
Estonian War Museum 6-7 December 2016

A map of Europe is shown in the background, with a light beige color and a thin black border. The map highlights the Baltic region in a light red color. The word "Outline" is centered at the top in a large, bold, black font. Below it, a list of seven bullet points is displayed. The word "Sources" is centered below the list in a large, bold, black font. Below "Sources", another list of three bullet points is shown. The map includes labels for "Pöng" and "Budapest".

Outline


- ❖ Basics from the strategic position of the Baltic Approaches (Denmark-Schleswig-Holstein)
- ❖ Mid-1950s to the 1960s (perception and real threat)
- ❖ 1970s to 1980 (perception and real threat)
- ❖ After 1981(perception and real threat)
- ❖ At the end of the Cold War (threat, perception and defence plan)
- ❖ Concluding observations

Sources

- ❖ Sources and literature from Germany and Poland on Soviet War Plans for the BALTAP area
- ❖ Declassified Danish Defence Intelligence threat analyses 1965, 1978, 1980 and 1991
- ❖ Personal memories of Danish War Plans 1973-1992


The analysis will be influenced by my decades long teaching of Russian military thought from the Miliutin reforms in 1860s to Ogarkov's late 1970s-early 1980s.

Basics from the strategic position of the Baltic Approaches (Denmark-Schleswig-Holstein)




- ❖ The general problem with West-European defence: the main power could be interdicted and thus hindered or at least hampered in its conventional deterrence and defence.
- ❖ This applied especially to NATO's thinly populated Northern Region (AFNORTH)

Basics from the strategic position of the Baltic Approaches (Denmark-Schleswig-Holstein)



- ❖ The great distance between the two AFNORTH threatened sub-regions: Northern Norway in the far north close to Murmansk and the Baltic Approaches (Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein) bordering NATO's Central Region.
- ❖ The total dependence on effective defence of Sweden's neutrality.

Basics from the strategic position of the Baltic Approaches (Denmark-Schleswig-Holstein)




- ❖ The limited defensive "depth" of Denmark and the very limited obstacle value of the terrain to armoured invasion.
- ❖ The vulnerability of Zealand with Copenhagen to a strategic coup.

Basics from the strategic position of the Baltic Approaches (Denmark-Schleswig-Holstein)



- ❖ The large Soviet, Polish and NVA forces very close to Denmark and bordering Schleswig-Holstein.

Basics from the strategic position of the Baltic Approaches (Denmark-Schleswig-Holstein)



- ❖ The expected initial operations on the North German Plain against the Netherlands and Jutland plus landings in Zealand.



The 1965 naval threat perception

WARSAWAPAGT-flåden i ØSTERSØEN vurderes at omfatte følgende enheder:

TYPE	SOVJET	POLEN	ØSTTYSKLAND	TALT
Krydsere	3	0	0	3
Missiljagere	2	0	0	2
Jagere	18	3	0	21
Fregatter	17	0	4	21
Ministrygere, store	72	15	20	107
Ministrygere, små	120	19	36	175
Antiubådsfartøjer	104	11	14	129
Patruljefartøjer	0	13	0	13
Motormissilbåde	45	?	4	49
Motortorpedobåde	100	19	27	146
Ubåde, missil	1	0	0	1
Ubåde, store	40	1	0	41
Ubåde, mellem	15	1	0	16
Ubåde, små	7	6	0	13
Landgangsfartøjer, mellem	57	8	5	70
Landgangsfartøjer, små	100	26	12	138


- ❖ From the start, the Soviet Naval Warfare strategy for the Baltic Sea had two elements:
 - ❖ First the attrition and defeat of a Western naval offensive into the sea by all naval means plus coastal defence missile system.
 - ❖ Secondly an offensive to gain control of the Straits for offensive naval operations in the North Sea and beyond.

The 1965 threat perception of total number of WTO army formations for the Coastal Front)


OMRÅDE ART	DDR		POLEN		V-LIGE USSR	I ALT
	SOVJETISK	ØSTTYSK	SOVJETISK	POLSK	SOVJETISK	
MOTINF/MEK DIV	2	2 +)		8	3	15
PNDIV	2	1	1	5	2	11
LBDIV				1	2	3
I ALT	4	3	1	14	7	29



- ❖ Notice a very large force of both Soviet, NVA and Polish land forces for potential use in the Coastal Front and thus also against the Danish area.



The 1965 threat perception



- ❖ Uncertainty about the timings – and relative timings – of the two operations.

The 1965 treat perception of air transport capacity

TOTAL

	ANTAL FLY	LASTEKAPACITET ved forventet combat radius (ton)	
		TRANSPORTEFLY	HELIKOPTERE
1. VTA	510	9317/9068	
2. ØSTTYSKLAND	336	558/576	372
3. POLEN	151	194/201	72
4. BALTISKUM	117	73	123
IALT:	1114	10069/9845	567

- ❖ The transport aircraft units considered used against Denmark included the CUB (Antonov-12) Regiment identified in Tartu.

The 1960s (1965 perception)

c. Flystyrker.

(1) WARSAWAPAGTEN råder i interesseområdet over følgende fly:

(a) Jagerbombefly, der primært har "AIR-TO-GROUND" opgaver.

ØSTTYSKLAND.	24.LA	6 RGT med ca.	215 fly
	NVA/L		0 -
POLEN.	37.LA	1 RGT med ca.	35 -
	PAF	8 RGT med ca.	280 -
BALTIKUM.	30.LA	2 RGT med ca.	70 -
Ialt:			600 fly

(b) Bombefly.

ØSTTYSKLAND.	24.LA	3 RGT med ca.	100 fly
	NVA/L		0 -
POLEN.	37.LA		0 -
	PAF	1 BDE med ca.	40 -
BALTIKUM.	30.LA	1 RGT med ca.	30 -
	ØFL	5 RGT med ca.	120 -
Ialt:			290 fly

(c) Luftforsvarsfly.


ØSTTYSKLAND.	24.LA	9 RGT med ca.	325 fly
	NVA/L	6 RGT med ca.	250 -
POLEN.	37.LA	5 RGT med ca.	180 -
	PAF	13 RGT med ca.	490 -
BALTIKUM.	30.LA	2 RGT med ca.	70 -
	FVO	7 RGT med ca.	250 -
Ialt:			1565 fly

The Soviet aircraft expected used against BALTAP included both the aircraft in Poland and the DDR, 30 Air Army in the Baltic Military District and other aircraft based here.




- ❖ SS-4 SANDALS (R-12, 8K63U) from several locations and SS-5 SKEANS (R-14 Chusovaya, 8K65) from Latvia.

Mid-1950s threat



- ❖ Main Coastal Front polish offensive against Jutland.
- ❖ Landing operation shown closely relation to the land offensive.
- ❖ No nuclear weapon use shown.

Polish Army's Roles 1945-1975




- ❖ Concentration on offensive operations of the Coastal Front from early 1960s.



- ❖ Three landings, two related.
- ❖ Supported by nuclear strikes and air landing.

Mid-1960s threat



- ❖ Rough outline of an offensive after forward deployment.
- ❖ Emphasis on the Netherlands' operational axis.
- ❖ Interdiction and counter-value use of nuclear weapons.




The 1978 threat perception



❖ Assumed fronts in an invasion of Western Europe.

The 1980 threat perception



❖ Now estimated to strategic directions within the theatre.

The naval threat perception

	USSR(1)	Polen	DDR	I alt
Overfladeenheder				
- missilarmerede (overflade-til-overflade missiler) (KASHIN MOD, TARANTUL, NANUCHKA)	11			11
- missilbåde (MATKA, OSA)	36	13	15	64
- missilarmerede (overflade-til luft) (KASHIN, KOTLIN SAM, KANIN, KONI)	3	1	2	6
- missilarmerede (overflade-til-undervandsmissiler) (KRIVAK)	8			8
- ældre artilleriarmerede (krydsere, jagere, fregatter)	20			20
- nyere, artilleriarmerede eskorte- og patruljefartøjer (MIRKA, PETYA, POTI)	34			34
- torpedobåde (SHERSHEN, TURYA, WISLA, LIBELLE)	20	12	49	81
- mindre patruljefartøjer	90	46	12	148
- oceangående minestrygere	44	23		67
- kystminestrygere og minestrygningsfartøjer	113	23	52	188
- landgangsskibe og -fartøjer (nyere)	21	23(2)	12	56
I alt	400	141	142	683
Ubåde				
- strategiske, missilarmerede (GOLF II)	6			6
- missilarmerede (LONG BIN)	2			2
- torpedoarmerede	62	4		66
I alt	70	4		74

The land threat perception

OMRÅDE ART	DDR		POLEN		V-LIGE USSR	I ALT
	SOVJETISK	ØSTTYSK	SOVJETISK	POLSK	SOVJETISK	
MOTINF/MEK DIV	2	2 +)		8	3	15
PNDIV	2	1	1	5	2	11
LBDIV				1	2	3
I ALT	4	3	1	14	7	29

STYRKER, DER VIL KUNNE INDGÅ I KYSTFRONTEN.

3. Nedennævnte styrker eller dele heraf vil kunne indgå i Kystfronten.

4. Hærstyrker.

FRA DDR:

- 2. Garde Panzer Armé (sovjetisk) med to motoriserede infanteridivisioner og to panserdivisioner,
- Militærdistrikt V (østtysk) med to motoriserede infanteridivisioner og en panserdivision. Et regiment fra den ene motoriserede infanteridivision er uddannet til at udføre landgangsoperationer.

Fra Polen:

- En panserdivision (sovjetisk),
- Pommerske militærdistrikt med tre mekaniserede divisioner og to panserdivisioner,
- Schlesiske militærdistrikt med to mekaniserede divisioner og tre panserdivisioner,

❖ Mentioning Soviet formations that might be included in the Coastal Front.

The air threat perception

Flystyrker.

Fra DDR:

- dele af 16. Frontluftarmé (sovjetisk). Disse dele vurderes til maksimalt tre jagerbomberregimenter (158 fly), tre jagerregimenter (158 fly) og et rekognosceringsregiment (33 fly),
- et østtysk jagerbomberregiment (34 fly),
- en østtysk rekognosceringsenhed (14 fly),
- en østtysk marine ASW-enhed (6 helikoptere).

Fra Polen:

- dele af 37. Frontluftarmé (sovjetisk). Luftarmeen omfatter følgende kampfly: tre jagerbomberregimenter (129 fly), tre jagerregimenter (146 fly) og et rekognosceringsregiment (48 fly),
- dele af det polske flyvevåben. Disse dele vurderes til maksimalt seks jagerbomberregimenter (221 fly), tre jagerregimenter (105 fly), to rekognosceringsregimenter (54 fly) og en ECM/ESM enhed (4 fly),
- den polske marines flyvevåben omfattende et jagerbomberregiment (36 fly), en rekognosceringsenhed (16 fly) og en ASW enhed (10 helikoptere).

Fra Sovjetunionen:

- dele af 30. Frontluftarmé. Luftarmeen omfatter følgende kampfly: et bomberregiment (44 fly), to jagerbomberregimenter (113 fly), to jagerregimenter (88 fly) og et rekognosceringsregiment (34 fly),
- dele af 1. Frontluftarmé. Luftarmeen omfatter følgende kampfly: tre jagerbomberregimenter (167 fly), tre jagerregimenter (135 fly), et rekognosceringsregiment (44 fly) og et helikopterregiment (30 helikoptere).

HEM

Afklassificeret

30. Frontluftarmé.


I Baltiske Militærdistrikt (BAMD) findes 30. Frontluftarmé, der er underlagt militærdistriktet. Luftarmeen omfatter ca. 280 kampfly:

<u>enheder/rolle</u>	<u>antal</u>	<u>type</u>	<u>total</u>
2 jagerregimenter	26	FISHBED D/F	
	16	FISHBED J/K/L	
	46	FLOGGER B/C	(88)
3 jagerbomberreg.	42	FISHBED D/F	
	71	FENCER	(113)
1 bomberregiment	44	BREWER (incl. 12 ECM)	(44)
1 rekognosceringsreg.	20	FISHBED H	
	14	BREWER D	(34)

30. Frontluftarmé har som eneste luftarmé i nærområdet FENCER jagerbombere. Tilstedeværelsen af disse fly har kraftigt forøget Frontluftarmeens fleksibilitet og operative formåen og forøget truslen mod det danske område.

- ❖ Lists the air forces available: Parts of 16th Frontal Air Army, NVA-L, PAF, parts of 37th Frontal Air Army, parts of 30th Frontal Air Army (incl. 71 FENCERS) and parts of 1st Frontal Air Army.

The air threat perception



The 1970s threat



The actual FEB 1970 Coastal Front Plan

- ❖ From Jaruzelskis office.
- ❖ Show all Polish forces, including those not under Coastal Front command (such as the Polish forces of the Baltic Fleet)
- ❖ Show offensive after forward deployment 2nd and 1st Polish Army (detailed version of the earlier one)
- ❖ Heavily supported by nuclear weapons.
- ❖ Note that the final objective seems to be Calais.
- ❖ Neighbour to the south 2 Guards Tank Army
- ❖ Note naval engagement in the Kattegat.

The 1970s threat



The actual FEB 1970 Coastal Front Plan

- ❖ Part of same plans map with operation against Zealand.
- ❖ Nuclear air bombing of central Copenhagen (Government, harbour), Danish forces in landing sectors, depot-area.

The 1970s threat



CPX: Details 1972

- ❖ Basically similar operation with heavy use of nuclear weapons.
- ❖ This, however, a short-warning invasion with 5 NVA in First Operational Echelon in the Jutland direction.


The 1970s threat



CPX: 1974 – short warning


- ❖ Similar scenario, with all the different phases of the naval campaign shown.

The 1970s threat



- ❖ After forward deployment of Polish Army.
- ❖ Follow-on operations against South Norway.
- ❖ Hand-over from Viktor Kulikov to Nikolai Ogarkov.
- ❖ Post-ex conclusion: No longer considered realistic with the improvement of NATO defensive strength (mobilised formations, dedicated air and land reinforcements, improved anti-tank capabilities) and with the air and future reconnaissance-strike capabilities to hinder the timely arrival of second strategic echelon.


The 1980 threat status



- ❖ After forward deployment of Polish Army.
- ❖ Still no change




The 1983 threat



- ❖ Reagan's rhetoric underline the risk and pessimism.
- ❖ Total humiliation in 1982 in the skies over Lebanon of Soviet type aviation underline interdiction reality.
- ❖ The reaction to NATO actual and pending improvements: Immediate combat readiness in first operational echelon forces makes conventional preemption on Western start of defence deployments both possible and necessary, including deep operations with OMGs.

The 1983 threat

Westlicher Kriegsschauplatz, 1. Strategische Staffel




1. Strategische Staffel der Vereinten Streitkräfte des Warschauer Vertrages auf dem Westlichen Kriegsschauplatz



❖ Decision by first strategic Echelon.

The 1983 threat



❖ The three navies did not mix, even this late.

Operation der Vereinten Ostseeflotte mit Angriffscharakter

Formen des operativen Einsatzes:

- Operationen nationaler Flotten
- Operationen von operativen und operativ-taktischen Vereinigungen
- Seeoperationen
- systematische Kampfhandlungen
- Teilnahme an der Luft- Seelandungsoperation auf den dänischen Inseln

Ziel:

- gegnerische Gruppierungen in der Ostsee sowie im östlichen Teil der Nordsee zerschlagen
- Seeherrschaft in diesen Gebieten erringen
- Flugzeugträgergruppierungen in der Operationszone vernichten
- Handlungen der Truppen der Front unterstützen

Quelle: Siegfried Lautsch, nach Ministerium für Nationale Verteidigung, Hauptstab, o. D.

© ZMSBw
06859-03

The 1983 (threat)

Operation der Vereinten Ostseeflotte mit Verteidigungscharakter

Aufgaben:

- Schläge der Fliegerkräfte abwehren bzw. sich ihnen entziehen
- Überwasserstoßgruppierungen angreifen und vernichten
- U-Boote suchen und vernichten
- Minenlegen durch gegnerische Kräfte verhindern
- Ostseeausgänge blockieren und ein Vordringen in die Tiefe verhindern
- an der Landungsabwehr teilnehmen

Außerdem mit Kriegsbeginn:

- Im Zusammenwirken mit der Nordmeerflotte der UdSSR Flugzeugträgergruppierungen vernichten
- gegnerische Seeverbindungen stören

Quelle: Siegfried Lautsch, nach Ministerium für Nationale Verteidigung, Hauptstab, o. D.

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
The naval defensive-offensive mix remains the same throughout the Cold War.

The 1983 threat



The Northern Strategic action

The 1983 threat



Ex-Chief of General Staff, Marshal Viktor Kulikov's
1983 Short Warning Concept

- ❖ Outline for the 1st Front operations in the Kulikov concept.
- ❖ Denmark no longer first operational echelon objective.

The 1983 threat



The Polish Army part against Jutland

Such the Jutland Direction for the second operational echelon, Polish part, mission.

The 1983 threat

DOCUMENTS / KOMMERSANT Vlast, MARCH 29, 2005 Interview with
Colonel General Matvey Burlakov about the situation during the crisis
period

So you were preparing for war in the early 1980s?

We weren't just preparing. We were prepared! Marshall Ogarkov set up four strategic sectors for waging an offensive war. The Western one was in Legnica, Poland, and Smolensk. The Southwestern one was in Chisinau, the Southern in Baku, the Far Eastern (Chinese) was in Ulan-Ude. Hungary (the Southern Group) went along with the Kiev and Odessa Districts. We were to crush the south of Europe, including Italy. The Joint Staff still has those plans. They may still come in handy. Everything is worked out in them, although some of it has to be elaborated.

The 1983 threat

DOCUMENTS / KOMMERSANT Vlast, MARCH 29, 2005 Interview with Colonel General Matvey Burlakov about the situation during the crisis period

Was the use of nuclear weapons planned for?

Of course.

We would have struck first?

Of course.

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that the USSR would not use nuclear weapons first.

He said one thing and the military thought another. We are the ones who are responsible for wars.

Isn't the political leadership responsible for waging war?

The political leadership – Gorbachev and the others – betrayed the Soviet Union. The Americans bought them.

The 1983 threat


DOCUMENTS / KOMMERSANT Vlast, MARCH 29, 2005 Interview with Colonel General Matvey Burlakov about the situation during the crisis period

They say we would have made it to Paris in a week. Easy. We had a sea of tanks in the Western Group of Forces. Three tank armies! And what did the Germans have? The workweek ends on Friday and then you wouldn't find anyone, not a minister or a soldier. Just guards. By the time they realized what was happening, we would have burned up their tanks and looted their armories. There was no question about it.




- ❖ Dependence on:
 - ❖ Mobilisation of reserves including for fleshing-out standing units.
 - ❖ Arrival of air reinforcements.
 - ❖ Forward deployment and defence preparation.
 - ❖ Mine laying.
 - ❖ Total defence measures to support logistics.

- ❖ Dependence on offensive operations to attrit the enemy naval and air means.




At the end of the Cold War (threat, perception 1991)



- ❖ Revaluation of Soviet plans against southern Sweden, probably as a result of the Soviet submarine activity in southern and eastern Swedish waters.

At the end of the Cold War (threat, perception 1991)




❖ More accurate picture.

At the end of the Cold War (threat, perception 1991)

VESTLIGE GRUPPE AF STYRKER (VGS)



NORDLIGE GRUPPE AF STYRKER (NGS)




	KVG	PMV	IKK	ART	RKK	MT	PVKN	PVMIS	KVG BRO
1 GPA	720	300	950	450	54	150	24	63	30
2 GPA	780	860	1290	580	72	250	90	153	35
3 SA	680	10	575	290	36	60	12	27	25
8 GA	980	740	1050	560	72	190	72	110	45
20 GA	525	325	830	325	36	110	60	66	20
ARTDIV				220	72				
ØVRIGE ENH	25	40		20	6	40			
VGS TOTAL	3710	2295	4695	2445	348	800	258	419	155

	KVG	PMV	IKK	ART	RKK	MT	PVKN	PVMIS	KVG BRO
NGS TOTAL	580	290	440	234	36	84	12	45	20


❖ Advantage of information from CFE-information.

At the end of the Cold War (threat, perception 1991)

BALTISKE MILITÆRDISTRIKT (BAMD)



HVIDERUSSISKE MILITÆRDISTRIKT (BEMD)



	KVG	PHV	IKK	ART	RKK	MT	PVKN	PVMIS	KVG BRO
11 GA	1000	450	920	400	100	120	42	90	44
ARTDIV				150	50		54	18	
ØVRIGE ENH	1370	1500	1000	700	170	280	138	171	62
BAMD TOTAL	2370	1950	1920	1250	320	400	234	279	106

	KVG	PHV	IKK	ART	RKK	MT	PVKN	PVMIS	KVG BRO
5 GPA	940		750	300	40	90	18	27	40
7 GPA	940		750	300	40	90	18	27	40
28 A	1130	300	900	390	50	130	36	54	50
TO ARTDIV				400	100		120	36	
ØVRIGE ENH	500	300	500	220	50	110	12	45	25
BEMD TOTAL	3510	600	2900	1610	280	420	186	189	155

At the end of the Cold War (threat, perception 1991)

A2: ca. 24 timer
 B : ca. 48 timer
 C1: ca. 72 timer
 C2: 3-7 dage
 D : 5-9 dage

Personellet til disse enheder vil generelt kunne være til rådighed blandt det personel, som er hjemsendt indenfor de seneste 5 år. Kadrene vil i stor udstrækning være til stede ved enhederne eller ved skoler, administrative stabe o.lign.

Kategoriseringen af de i nærområdet værende sovjetiske divisioner fremgår af nedenstående skema:

	MOTINFDIV						PNDIV						LBDIV		
	A2	B	C1	C2	D	SUM	A2	B	C1	C2	D	SUM	A2	B	C1
VGS	8	0	0	0	0	8	7	0	0	0	0	7			
NGS	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1			
BAMD	0	1	0	6	0	7	0	1	2	0	0	3	1	0	1
BEMD	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	1	7	1	1	10	1	0	
TOTAL	9	2	0	7	0	18	8	2	9	1	1	21	2	0	1

Concluding observations

- ❖ Numerical threat and perception of operational missions were accurate
- ❖ Failure to see the importance of Viktor Kulikov's/Nikolaj Ogarkov's emphasis on preemption in the early 1980s
- ❖ Thus failure to see the demise of the Coastal Front and the early threat against Denmark
- ❖ Soviet forces in Estonia were of marginal interest for BALTAP defence (SS-4, AN-12 unit in Tartu, Baltic Fleet minesweepers)